As the REIT regime has been expanding globally, corporate governance practices in emerging REIT markets have become a major concern for domestic and international investors alike.
INTRODUCTION
With the rise of corporations, the separation of ownership from management has led to conflict of interests. Moral hazard problem, as it is referred to in the finance literature, is based on the premise that corporate managers do not always act in the best interest of the owners. In their seminal paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) highlighted the tendency of managers to consume expensive perquisites when they own only a fraction of the firm's ownership. Managers are also prone to spending available funds in "empire building" projects that entrench their position and enhance their reputation, often at the expense of shareholders' interest (Ooi, 2000) . Based on past scandals, outside investors would have little confidence in managers. Arguing for the importance of REIT corporate governance, Sirmans (1997) The recent global financial crisis has further highlighted the importance of promoting adequate corporate governance practices. While it is sometimes argued that REIT-like regimes provide a regulatory framework that makes superfluous the need for stringent corporate governance rules, it makes no doubt countries with the greater scrutiny in terms of corporate governance provisions (e.g., USA) are also those where the best practices and the most The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, passed in response to the failure of large and previously successful corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Adelphia, is intended to prevent manipulation of internal governance mechanism by incumbent management. As noted by Bianco, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) , a primary focus of the Act was to legislate internal corporate governance wit h the expectation that improved monitoring will result in superior performance. developed real estate capital markets can be found. Asian REITs are somewhat greenfields in terms of corporate governance, in part due to the fact that REIT regimes are still relatively new in Asia but also because of Asian REITs' structural idiosyncrasies. In recent years, many Asian countries have released codes providing directives on corporate governance, and in some cases, specific references to the listed real estate sector's corporate governance (e.g. Singapore's Code on Collective Investment Schemes updated in 2005). Local regulators are indeed aware that agency problems pertain to the broader topic of transparency which is a key factor in the long term success of Asian financial markets (Low, 2004) . Transparency fosters efficiency, which in turn attracts domestic and foreign investors whose commitment is paramount whenever economies, and property markets, face some tough times. This paper addresses the issue of corporate governance practices in emerging Asian REIT markets. It is divided into two parts. In the first part, an analytical framework is developed to score corporate governance practices amongst externally managed Asian REITs. As a pilot study, the framework is applied to REITs listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange (S-REITs).
Out of a maximum possible score of 88, the score of the average S-REIT over the study period is at best 23.38 or 27%. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the best and worst performers as shown by the range between the minimum (12) and maximum (30) calculated scores. In the second part, we examine the relationship between corporate governance and performance. The empirical tests based on several performance-related metrics provide evidence supporting a positive correlation between corporate governance and stock performance. In other words, firms with higher corporate governance tend to register better stock returns on riskadjusted basis.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Governance mechanisms are designed to monitor the manager and mitigate the potential conflict of interest between the owners and managers. Bianco, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) provide a good overview of the various governance mechanisms available to protect shareholders' interests.
Broadly, they categorized the governance mechanisms as either internal or external. Internal controls include the board of directors, various monitoring committees, separation of the roles of CEO and chairman of the board, ownership of stock by managers and directors, and performance-based compensation for managers and directors. External governance, on the other hand, is provided mainly by the market for corporate control on the premise that the threat of takeover will remove inefficient management.
Two important questions on corporate governance are firstly, how do we gauge the level of corporate governance, and secondly, how effective are governance mechanisms in fostering corporate performance? One of the most prominent measures of corporate governance is the Governance Index (more commonly referred to as the G-Index) developed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) . Measuring the balance of power sharing between shareholders and managers, the G-index is simply a sum of the barriers a firm uses to insulate its managers from hostile takeover. Cautioning the need to be careful in interpreting the G-index, Bianco, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) argue that more attention must be paid to internal governance of REITs since the takeover market is ineffective. Thus, they contend that a composite index incorporating both internal and external governance is a promising area of future research.
A large body of literature on the relationship between corporate governance and performance exists. The earlier studies focused on specific governance mechanisms, such as stock ownership and board composition, have yielded inconclusive results. Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) find that board composition has no significant effect on performance. Cho (1998) finds that investment affects corporate value which, in turn, affects ownership structure, but not vice versa. Loderer and Martin (1997) further observe that abnormal stock returns associated with 876 acquisition announcements are not affected by the stock ownership of managers. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick's (2003) seminal study involving 1500 large listed firms between 1990 and 1999 shows that firms with stronger shareholder rights perform better in terms of higher firm value, profits and sales growth; lower capital expenditures and fewer corporate acquisitions.
Internationally, Klapper and Love (2004) examine 374 firms in 14 markets. Ranking their corporate governance based on management discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness and social awareness, the authors find firms in countries with weak legal system have lower corporate governance rankings. They also find good governance is related to higher market valuation and operating performance, particularly in weakly regulated countries. In another study, Lemmon and Lins (2003) examine the impact of management ownership and control rights of 800 listed firms in eight East Asian countries during the Asian financial crisis. They observe that returns are 10-20% points lower for firms in which managers have high level of control rights but have separated their control and cash ownership; concluding that ownership structure is important. identify a partial lack of a relation between governance and performance in the US listed real estate sector corresponding to a 'REIT effect'.
[ Table 1 ] 2 First introduced in 2002, the Corporate Governance Quotient index (CGQ) is produced by RiskMetrics, a private company leader in the field of governance data. Originally based on the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) database, it encompasses eight different categories of governance practices relevant for investors. However, the index is not specifically designed for any specific sector and is mostly relevant for corporations operating according to a US-centric model.
ASIAN REIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX (R-Index)
A prevalent notion, as highlighted by Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu (2004) who study US REITs'
IPOs, is that governance need not be a major concern for regulated firms because much of the regulatory provisions are designed to protect the interest of stakeholders. Some examples of REIT regulations in Singapore that aim to iron out potential agency problems are: (1) stricter rules on related party transactions; (2) annual valuation of property assets by external appraiser, who cannot assess the REIT's property for more than two consecutive years; (3) procedures to remove REIT managers, and (4) mandatory high payout ratio that reduces the firm's free cash flow, which is one of the major sources of agency conflicts between owners and managers.
Nonetheless, notwithstanding regulators' endeavors, Singapore REITs, and more generally Asian REITs, are not in par with their US counterparts as far as agency problems. They operate in an environment and are based on organizational models which are highly idiosyncratic and counter-intuitive to corporate governance experts. Consequently, as the REIT regime has been expanding globally over the last ten years, the effectiveness of corporate governance practices among Asian REITs has become a major concern for domestic and international investors alike.
In this section, we discuss the process used to construct the corporate governance index for S-REITs. The index is called the R-Index. The primary reason for our focus on Singapore REITs is twofold: data availability and the exemplarity of the S-REIT regime as defining a generic model of externally managed REITs in Asia. As of December 2008, there are 20 REITs listed on the Singapore Exchange. They constitute the study sample. Our study period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) covers the entire history of public REITs in Singapore, since the first REIT (CapitaMall Trust) was listed. We have 63 firm-year observations after filtering missing data. Financial data of the sampled REITs are extracted from Datastream.
[ There is one major caveat however with replicating a commercial index. Whereas academic indices are usually the sum of 'good' or 'bad' corporate governance mechanisms for each firm, commercial indices apply proprietary algorithms, which makes them virtually impossible to replicate (Daines, Gow, and Larcker, 2009). 4 With respect to Singapore, an alternative to creating our own index would have been to use the National University of Singapore's Governance and Transparency Index (NUS GTI). However, this academic index does not cater to the listed real estate sector. It is a broad index which is applied to all Singapore listed companies, but seems irrelevant for S-REITs (which are not customarily included in its ratings).
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In addition to Singapore REITs, Japanese REITs, Malaysian REITs, South Korean REITs as well almost all HK-REITs are externally managed as of December 2009. has been extensively researched in the real estate literature (e.g. Capozza and Seguin, 2000) .
However, its influence on corporate governance in the context of an aggregate index has been totally overlooked until now. Bauer et al. (2009) acknowledge that it might be an issue when applying the CGQ Index. As their focus is on US REITs, the authors disregard the problem.
S-REITs take the legal form of a Trust involving a Sponsor, generally a large real estate company, a Trustee, a Trust Manager and a Property Manager. This organization generates a myriad of agency problems, among which fees and related party transactions (RPT) are paramount, at least seen for the viewpoint of international investors. Although the trust structure and the external management seem a double aberration for many Western analysts, the concept of "captive entities" as defined in Hsieh and Sirmans (1991) Lee and Foo (2010) explain that Singapore authorities adopted the Trust structure because S-REITs were originally contemplated as being passive real estate investment funds. As the financial crisis has made active management of the S-REITs portfolio critical for their survival, the ability of the Trustee to supervise the Manager takes a new relevance. They argue that the Trust structure has too many agency issues and inadequacies to enable the further development of the listed real estate sector, and advocate the corporatisation of S-REITs.
The fact that corporate governance practices are country/region specific should therefore come as no surprise, even in era of transnational economies. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) show that country characteristics explain much of the variance in governance ratings among 495 firms from 25 countries (including 29 and 25 firms respectively from Singapore and Hong Kong). In view of the idiosyncrasies of Singapore's listed real estate sector, it becomes clear that resorting to existing indices of corporate governance is not an option for this study. An index of corporate governance applied to externally managed Asian REITS has to be developed in order to encapsulate the above-mentioned elements and provide a balanced, contextual view of SREITs' governance practices.
Corporate Governance Provisions in the R-Index
The R-Index encompasses 27 governance factors spanning 8 categories of both external and internal corporate governance. The 8 categories are: 1) Board Matters 2) Audit Committee 3)
Remuneration Matters 4) REIT Organization 5) Fees 6) Related Party Transactions 7) Gearing 8)
Ownership. Table 3 presents a list of the 27 governance provisions.
[ Table 3 The unique situation of Asian REITs pervades all 27 provisions included in the R-Index.
Four categories in the R-Index are more specific to externally managed REITs: REIT Organization, Fees, Related Party Transactions, and Gearing. The paper will briefly describe the underlying provisions in these four categories before introducing the index scorecard in the next section. Table 4 presents the main agency issues at stake in all 8 categories of the R-Index.
[ Table 4 ]
REIT Organization
Appendix 1 shows the classic structure of a S-REIT. Although this generic model is shared by all sponsored S-REITs, there can be significant differences among REITs both in terms origin and involvement of the various parties. For instance, the Trust Manager might be a subsidiary of the Sponsor, or an external manager with no links whatsoever with the other parties in the Trust.
Similarly, the Property Manager might be related to the Sponsor, or in the case of external managers to the Trust Manager. Classically, the Trustee is rather passive. However, the Property Fund Guidelines mention several instances in which the Trustee should play a proactive role (e.g.
Related Party Transactions). In such a setting, the entrenchment of the Trust Manager generates potentially huge agency issues. Conditions leading to the choice of manager as well as provisions for removal (including consequences of termination of management agreements) are essential points covered in the R-Index.
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The Singapore government who is well aware of the importance of governance for establishing Singapore as a major financial centre aims to foster good corporate governance practices. In February 2010, MAS has announced the establishment of a Corporate Governance Council gathering prominent business figures whose mission is "to promote a high standard of corporate governance in companies listed in Singapore, so as to maintain investors' confidence and enhance Singapore's reputation as a leading and trusted international financial centre". Likewise, MAS conducts regular reviews (through consultation papers) of the regulatory regime governing S-REITs on a broad range of issues (such as AGM requirement in May 2009).
The main document regulating REIT organization is the Trust Deed. S-REITs frequently refer to this document in their annual reports. However, few go as far as providing a summary of the Trust Deed's main provisions in their communication with unitholders. In some cases, access to the Trust Deed is actually very complex and virtually impossible for unitholders, let alone outsiders. Trust deed's accessibility is part of the R-Index's ratings. Table 5 presents an overview of the accessibility of S-REITs' trust deeds as of December 2008.
[ Table 5 ] Last but not least, although until 2009, S-REITs were not required to hold an annual general meeting, some decided to voluntarily do so, which is also accounted for in the R-Index.
Fees
The Trust structure generates an array of fees from the Trust to the Manager, the Property Manager, and the Trustee. Manager's fees are the most important ones among these fees. In the externally managed framework, the REIT itself has no employees. The Manager performs all work on behalf of the Trust in exchange for fees. Manager's fees include a base fee, a performance fee and, in some cases, acquisition/ divestment fees. Base fees and performance fees (whose total amounts to manager's management fees) can take many shapes, from a flat percentage of the Asset Under Management (AUM) to a percentage of net income conditional on a pre-determined benchmark, or any combination in-between (Ooi, 2010) . The structure and disclosure of all three categories of fees are key indicators of good corporate governance in the R-Index. In a principal-agent framework, the more fees are conditional on Manager's actual performance, the better for unitholders. The situation is similar for Property Manager's fees.
Acquisition and divestment fees paid to the Trust Manager are particularly controversial.
Combined with management fees based on AUM, they might give the wrong incentives to managers and become enmeshed into the broader issues of related party transactions and gearing.
As a result, the R-Index favors S-REITs which do not pay acquisition / divestment fees to their Managers. If such fees are paid, S-REITs are scored on their level of disclosure.
Finally, the R-Index focuses on the relative level of fees assessed by two operating metrics: manager's management fees as a percentage of deposited properties, and total manager's fees as a percentage of net property income.
Related Party Transactions
The Sponsor-satellite ownership model coupled with relatively narrow and illiquid commercial 
Gearing
The issue of gearing is not specific to Asian REITs. However, in the context of an externally managed Trust where Manager's fees are not linked to net income (i.e. net of borrowing costs), gearing can trigger significant agency costs (Capozza and Seguin, 2000) 9 . The R-Index scores 8 RiskMetrics (2009) notes about S-REITs that "in many cases, the Sponsor actually continues to acquire, develop and incubate properties post-listing of the REIT […] Injecting properties into a satellite REIT is often a tax efficient way of realizing value from those properties".
9
In a report on externally managed REITs (including Singapore and Hong Kong REITs), Moody's (2007) assesses that "corporate governance of externally managed REITs presents credit risk.
[…] The central governance the quality of REITs' disclosure as well as the impact of leverage on the Trusts' income generating abilities (proxied by borrowing costs as a percentage of net property income).
Scorecard of the R-Index
Appendix 2 presents the scorecard of the R-Index. The scores are determined based on 75 core elements. Each element is worth one point, with some multiple choice elements being rated 1, 0.5, or 0. In addition to these core 75 elements, the index encompasses a "bonus and penalty" system to account for the "comply and explain" feature of corporate governance practices in Singapore: 13 bonus points and 11 penalties materialized as one negative point each 10 . Hence, there are 99 elements in the R-Index. The overall score is simply the sum of all the points (core plus bonuses minus penalties). The index range is therefore [-11; +88] with a median at 38.5.
Annual scores and sub-scores based on data collected in annual reports are determined for each REIT, from inception to 2008, resulting in 63 firm-year observations. For each of the 8 corporate governance categories covered in the R-Index (i.e., Board Matters, Audit Committee, Remuneration Matters, REIT Organization, Fees, Related Party Transactions, Gearing, Ownership), the scorecard provides a sub-score. The higher the score and sub-scores, the better the corporate governance practices of the REIT.
The index methodology aims to be objective and transparent. However, once relevant elements are selected, crucial (and subjective) choices for the macro-relevance of the index have to be made with respect to weighting. The index weights depend on the number of elements in each category as shown in Table 6 below. In its current version, the R-Index emphasizes Fees (24% of total score), Board Matters (19%), Related Party Transactions (16%), and REIT risk is that external manager uses its control to extract value from the REIT to the detriment of shareholders and bondholders".
10
The R-Index follows the same methodology as the Corporate Governance Index developed by Patrick Lecomte for the Asian Public Real Estate Association (APREA). The "bonus and penalty" system is designed as an incentive for Asian REITs to improve their corporate governance practices. In selecting the core, bonus and penalty elements, the objective is to only include provisions with real significance for externally managed REITs, thereby avoiding a "kitchen sink" approach that tends to provide a less accurate measure of governance quality (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009). Organization (15%). These weights as well as the scorecard were established after an extensive consultation with institutional investors and experts in Asian REITs, all members of the Asian Public Real Estate Association (APREA).
[ Table 6] 3.4
Data: Summary and Analysis REITs (out of 20) are performing better than average. Besides, there are significant differences between the best and worst performers as shown by the range between the minimum and maximum calculated scores (2.27:1).
[ Table 7 ]
Looking at the 8 categories individually and comparing with the sub-scores' maximum possible values, the three best areas are Audit Committee, Board Matters, and Gearing whereas Remuneration, Fees, and RPTs are laggards. Noticeably, Fees is the sub-score with the largest standard deviation, indicating a great diversity of practices related to fees among S-REITs (as explained in Ooi, 2010) . Remuneration ranks consistently low as many REITs do not provide 11
The R-Index scorecard was defined so as to set ambitious goals in each category for Asian REITs to aim at. As a result, trends and comparisons among REITs are more meaningful for our analysis than absolute raw scores.
any information in that category (hence, an array of zero sub-scores). Table 8 shows the pairwise correlations between sub-scores.
[ Table 8 should not be over-extended. Nonetheless it is worth noting that pairwise correlations are overall small enough to substantiate the hypothesis that each sub-score captures a significant and distinct provision affecting S-REITs corporate governance.
EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In this section, we investigate whether corporate governance matters. The main hypothesis is that corporate governance, by aligning the interest of owners and managers, has a positive impact on corporate performance. Specifically, we test if REITs with high ratings in R-Index are correlated 12
One possible explanation for this difference might be the fact the job market for high flying real estate executives in Singapore is very competitive. Outside advisors have therefore little incentives to disclose information that might be used by their competitors to recruit their best employees whereas sponsor-related managers might feel they are better able to retain their staff due to the large range of career opportunities offered by the sponsors. with higher corporate performance and vice versa. Various performance metrics covering stock performance and operating performance are employed.
We begin the analysis by examining the correlation between R-Index scores and stock price performance. REITs in our sample are partitioned into two different portfolios based on whether their corporate governance scores are above or below the median score. The equallyweighted returns of the resulting two portfolios are computed and their return differences over time are reported in Table 9 . On the whole, the performance of the portfolios partitioned by the total scores suggests that corporate governance has an impact on REIT stock performance.
Specifically, S-REITs that are ranked above the median score registered 1.6 percentage points better than those that are ranked below the median score.
[ Table 9 ]
Decomposing the aggregated scores into their components, we find a positive relationship generally exists between the respective corporate governance scores and stock returns. Note that the bulk of the out-performance is concentrated during the IPO year, which is consistent with the fact all information pertaining to corporate governance practices is disclosed in IPO documents such as the Trust Deed.
14 It would be interesting to test if this inverse relationship holds for S-REITs with large activities out of their home market, for instance in China. However, there is not enough variation in the data to test the relationship which could define a 'home market effect' with respect to RPTs governance practices. Nevertheless, Wong, Ong and Ooi (2010) observe that Asian REIT IPOs that are sponsored by property developers, and hence have more scope to engage in RPTs, registered strong stock performance on their first trading day.
that RPTs may be efficient transactions that rationally fulfill other economic demands of a firm such as securing in-depth skills and expertise between participants with private information or providing an alternative form of compensation. Kohlbeck and Mayhey (2004) also find that future returns are marginally higher for companies engaged in RPT with investments. Their analyses suggest RPTs with investments appear to be associated with efficient contracting, while simple transactions with directors, officers and shareholders are associated with opportunism.
Overall, the univariate analyses above reveal the significant impact of governance on REIT stock performance. To formally test the impact of governance mechanisms on corporate performance, we estimate an OLS regression to identify the determinants of REIT stock performance. The key variable of interest in the regression models is naturally the R-Index score of the individual firm. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
where R-Index is the level of corporate governance score in year t-1 for REIT i. In equation (1), we also incorporate several variables that may influence stock returns as suggested by prior studies on the pricing of REIT and property stocks, such as Ambrose et al. (2000) , Bond, Karolyi and Sander (2003) , Ooi and Liow (2004) , and Ambrose, Bond and Ooi (2010) . Specifically, we control for firm size and growth opportunities by including the natural log of REIT i's market capitalization in year t and the ratio of REIT i's market-to book-value in year t. Since future stock price performance may reflect the firm's use of leverage, we also include D/E Ratio t,i, the debt asset ratio for REIT i year t as a control variable. X t represents a series of period fixed effects to capture any time-varying effects, such as credit availability and costs, over the study period.
We use two different return measures for corporate performance. The dependent variable in the regression model, r i,t, is the continuously compounded excess holding period return for REIT i for period t. The annual change in the individual REIT stock price is first computed, and then adjusted for the corresponding market return. Mathematically, the return measure can be expressed as follows:
, where P i,t is the stock price of ith REIT at time t, and M t is the all stocks price index at time t. As a robustness test, we also examine the impact of corporate governance on the economic gains of REITs using Jensen alpha R , is the corresponding weekly return on the market portfolio. If α is zero or not significantly different from zero, then the particular portfolio is earning normal returns. In other words, its weekly rate-of-return, adjusted for risk, is equivalent to the mean weekly rate-of-return for the market (see Cannon and Vogt, 1995; Ooi, 2010) . The descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 10 .
[ Table 10 ]
The central hypothesis we test is higher R-Index scores are associated with better stock performance. The estimation results for Equation 1 are presented in Table 11 under Panel A.
Model 1 and Model 2 report the regression coefficients with excess stock return and abnormal profit as the dependent variable, respectively. The results show evidence of a positive relationship between the corporate governance and stock returns, but is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The statistical strength of the impact of corporate governance on risk-adjusted returns is stronger, as shown in Model 2.
[ Table 11 ]
Consistent with the additional risk associated with higher leverage, we see that REITs with higher debt ratios have higher future holding period returns. However, as observed in the results for Model 2, the impact of debt becomes insignificant once we take into account the REIT's risk-adjusted performance. Thus, the monitoring benefit of debt is not supported. The coefficient for firm size is positive in Model 2, which indicates that large-sized REITs registered higher abnormal gains over the study period. This observation is consistent with the notion that large firms have better access to funds and manager talents (Bianco, Ghosh and Sirmans, 2007) .
REITs with high growth options, however, do not post superior returns. In several unreported regressions, we tried including other exogenous variables, such as dividend yield and returns on asset in the stock performance equation. The estimation results are similar and hence, not reported here.
One concern with the OLS results reported in Table 11 is the potential simultaneity of relationships in that corporate governance scores may themselves be a function of stock performance. To control for the possible simultaneity, we estimate a simultaneous system of equations with stock performance and governance as endogenous variables. Similar to Ghosh and Sirmans (2003), we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate this equation system. As in equation (1), the exogenous variables for the stock performance equation is firm size, leverage and growth opportunity. In order for the system of equations to be estimated, we include two additional variables, namely firm age and accounting profitability, as exogenous variables in the Table 11 . Overall, the results of the two-stage model are similar to the single equation model presented in Panel A. However, the relationship between corporate governance and stock performance becomes stronger. Thus, the significantly positive coefficients suggest that firms with higher corporate governance scores tend to record better stock performance, both in terms of excess returns as well as risk-adjusted returns. Note that when we substitute our market-based performance measures with standard accounting definitions, namely return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance ceases to be significant. See Table 12 . Overall, the results suggest that the benefits of better corporate governance, though masked in accounting statements, are appreciated by the market through the REITs stock price performance. The discrepancy of findings between equity returns and operating performances is actually recurrent in the corporate governance literature. For instance, Gompers et al. (GIM, 2003) who compare the impact of governance on various performance-related metrics document a robust relationship between their G-Index and equity prices among a sample of 1500 large US firms over the 1990s, but do not achieve the same consistent quality of regression
[ Table 12 ]
To understand the relation between corporate governance of S-REITs and efficiency of real estate capital markets in Singapore, we examine how the bid-ask spread of the individual REITs are related to their corporate governance scores. The maintained hypothesis is that stocks of REITs with better corporate governance are more attractive to investors, and hence, they achieve better pricing. Indeed, when the REITs are partitioned into two groups based on their RIndex scores, we observe that the group with higher corporate governance score consistently record lower bid-ask spreads over the study period (Table 13) . Results of the multivariate regression models, as reported in Table 14 , confirm the inverse relationship between corporate governance score and information asymmetry. Our results is consistent with the findings of Anglin et al (2010) that information asymmetry, as measured by the percentage of bid-ask spreads demanded by the market, is reduced by appropriately structured governance. Thus, it appears that corporate governance of S-REITs affects their stock performance through a reduction in information asymmetry, rather than improved operating efficiency, which would have been captured in accounting measures.
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[ Table 13 & Table 14] when using three operating performances (net-profit-margin, ROE, one-year sales growth). While the G-Index is significantly correlated to both net-profit-margin and sales-growth, there is no evidence of a strong link with ROE. Addressing this surprising result, Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) test for an association between governance and operating performance by examining operating return of assets in the GIM sample. They find a significant association with future operating performances and argue that governance causes systematic differences in operating performance which in turn cause systematic performance surprises to the market. Based on a sample of 220 US REITs, Bauer et al. (2010) find no evidence that the CGQ Index is related to any operating measures of performance (including ROA and ROE), which leads them to identify a "REIT effect" in comparison to regular C-Corps. Larcker, Richardson, Tuna (2007) explain that the common inability of corporate governance indexes to capture a link with operating performances might be due to an array of factors including intrinsic limitation of the corporate governance index, earnings management, the use of unreliable measures which display smoothness, persistence and poor accrual quality. In particular, as noted by Fama and French (2000) , measures of operating performances such as ROA are very persistent, which impedes the relevance of the regression with a corporate index whose changes are also usually gradual. 16 Another possible explanation for the positive relationship between corporate governance and stock returns in the absence of positive operating performance is that international investors prefer to invest in stocks of firms with better governance (as shown in Leuz, Lins, and Warnock, 2008) . However, we were unable to test this hypothesis due to lack of public data on the ownership of S-REIT stocks by international investors.
Besides, we analyze the factors that the market considers the most important as far as signaling good corporate governance practices. Substituting the overall R-Index score of the individual REITs with the various sub-scores in the regression models, we find that the two most important factors viewed by the market are Board matters and Remuneration as shown in Table   15 . This is consistent with our earlier observations derived from the univariate analysis. The other Corporate Governance sub-scores do not have any significant effect on the individual REITs' risk-adjusted performance.
[ Table 15 
Authors (Year) Data Findings
McIntosh, Rogers, Sirmans & Liang (1994) 55 REITs traded on NYSE and AMEX (1969-1990) . The probability of a management change is proxy for corporate governance (CG), whilst stock and market returns are employed to measure performance.
Inverse relationship between stock price performance and the probability of a management change.
Cannon & Vogt (1995) 42 equity REITs (1987 REITs ( -1992 . CG measures include management type (self-administered or advisor REITs), ownership structure and compensation, whilst performance is represented by Jensen's alpha & Sharpe's ratio.
Self-administered REITs outperformed advisor REITs. Ownership structure significantly affects the performance of advisor REITs, but not self-administered REITs.
Friday, Sirmans & Conover (1999) 399 Equity REITs; 276 hybrid and mortgage REITs (1980 REITs ( -1994 . CG is represented by ownership structure, whilst market-to-book ratio is employed to gauge performance.
Nonlinear relationship between firm value and ownership structure. Inside ownership reversely affects marketto-book ratio.
Ghosh & Sirmans (2003) 122 equity REITs (1999) . CG is represented by board independence and ownership structure, whilst performance is proxied by return on assets (ROA) and return of equity (ROE).
Independent directors, block and institutional ownership weakly enhance performance, whilst higher stock ownership and control of the board adversely affect performance.
Hartzell, Sun and Titman (2006) 153 Equity REITs (1995 REITs ( -2004 . CG measures include stock ownership, managerial compensation, director board structure and state of incorporation, whilst real estate asset growth, equity growth and debt growth are proxies for investment rate.
Strong links between investment behaviors and ownership structure. Well-governed REITs invest more in better investment opportunities. Bianco, Ghosh & Sirmans (2007) Market rewards REITs that pay their managers a low base fee coupled with a high incentive fee that is benchmarked against a predetermined level of performance. Table 3 .
List of Corporate Governance Provisions included in the R-Index
The list below presents the selection of corporate governance provisions included in the R-Index. The index encompasses 27 governance factors spanning 8 categories based on both external and internal corporate governance.
Figures in parenthesis represent the number of related elements in the R-Index core score (see Appendix 2 for a detailed copy of the scorecard).
Board Matters (16)
1-Board Composition (1) 2-Board Independence (1) 3-Nominating and Remuneration Committee (1) 4-Board Diversity (4) 5-CEO / Chairman Separation (1) 6-Board Meetings (2) 7-Disclosure of past/ present directorships (2) 8-Nominating Committee and Board Performance (4)
Audit Committee (4)
9-Audit Committee Meetings (2)
10-Audit Committee Composition (2)
Remuneration Matters (5) 11-Director and Executive Remuneration (5)
REIT Organization (11)
12-AGM (1) 13-Manager Independence, Provision for Removal (4) 14-Trustee: Trust Deed (4) 15-Governance Guidelines (2) Fees (18) 16-Structure of Manager's Management Fees (3) 17-Acquisition/ Divestment Fees (5) 18-Disclosure of Fees (1) 19-Property Manager's Fees (4) 20-Payment of Fees in Units (3) 21-Manager's Management Fees-% Levels (2)
Related Party Transactions (13)
22-Disclosure (9) 23-Role of Trustee (2) 24-Independent Experts (2)
Gearing (5) 25-Disclosure: Rating, Look-Through (4)
Ownership (3)
26-Disclosure (1) 27-Concentration (2) What is the quality of disclosure of RPTs in the REIT's annual reports? How involved is the Trustee? What is the role of independent experts?
What is the quality of disclosure? Is leverage compatible with the REIT's ability to generate income?
What is the quality of disclosure? How concentrated is the shareholding structure?
Independence of Board members from Sponsor/ Manager. Diversity and experience of Board members.
Independence and expertise of the Audit Committee's members.
Transparency and alignment of managers' and unitholders' interests.
Independence of the Manager from the Sponsor. Ability of Trustee to be part of Checks and Balances. Entrenchment of Manager. Transparency of management policies.
Misalignment of interests between managers and unitholders. Excessive charges born by the Trust due to non performance related fee structure.
Transparency and alignment of interests between Sponsor, Manager and unitholders.
Excessive gearing due to wrong incentives for Trust Manager (e.g. fees, RPTs) impacting unitholders' returns and investment prospects.
Sponsor-Satellite ownership model. Entrenchment of Manager. The numbers in brackets correspond to the possible [minimum value; maximum value] for the score and sub-scores. i) identity of interested parties and their relationships with the REIT 1 ii) details of the assets to be acquired or sold, including a description of these assets and their location 1 iii) the prices at which these assets are to be acquired or sold 1 iv) the details of the valuations performed (including names of the valuers, methods used to value these assets and the dates of the valuations) and their assessed values 1 v) current/ expected rental yield 1 22.4 If transactions greater than 5% of the NAV are immediately announced and subject to unitholders' votes 1 22.5 If transactions greater than 5% of the NAV are reviewed by an independent expert whose opinion was made public to unitholders 1 
